Europe’s green hydrogen strategy is rapidly becoming a foreign policy instrument, but the emerging network of partnerships with the Middle East, North Africa and Sub Saharan Africa remains far smaller and less institutionalized than the political rhetoric surrounding it suggests.
A study published in Sustainability, titled “Green Hydrogen Diplomacy: Examining Emerging Bilateral Partnerships Between the Middle East and North Africa, the European Union, and Sub Saharan Africa,” analyzes 26 bilateral green hydrogen agreements signed between 2020 and 2024. Its findings point to a market architecture dominated by a small group of European and producer countries, with most agreements still functioning as political signals rather than commercially mature supply arrangements.
That distinction matters as the European Union attempts to build an international hydrogen supply chain while simultaneously reducing its exposure to imported fossil fuels.
Under REPowerEU, the EU has set a target of producing 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen domestically and importing another 10 million tonnes by 2030. The strategy links hydrogen policy to industrial decarbonization and energy security, particularly in sectors where direct electrification is difficult.
The geopolitical dimension of that strategy became increasingly visible after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The study identifies a sharp increase in bilateral hydrogen diplomacy during this period. Eleven of the 26 agreements examined were signed in 2022, compared with two in 2021, while another nine were signed in 2023. Taken together, agreements signed in 2022 and 2023 represent 76.9% of the study’s sample.
The concentration coincided with the launch of REPowerEU and the COP27 summit in Egypt, suggesting that hydrogen moved rapidly from a predominantly climate policy discussion toward a broader strategic framework combining decarbonization, industrial policy and energy security.
The authors describe this development as “securitized decarbonization.” The concept captures an important shift in European energy diplomacy: renewable hydrogen is increasingly being treated not simply as a tool for reducing emissions but as a future strategic commodity around which Europe can establish new international supply relationships.
For countries in North Africa and Sub Saharan Africa, that creates an opportunity to move higher up the energy value chain. It also creates a risk that hydrogen becomes another export oriented resource sector in which renewable electricity, land and water are developed primarily to satisfy external demand.
A Hydrogen Network Dominated by a Few Countries
Germany and the European Union each appear in nine of the 26 agreements examined, representing 34.6% of the sample individually. Together, they are involved in 69.2% of the agreements. France and the Netherlands appear twice each, while several other EU member states have no agreements included in the dataset.
Morocco occupies the strongest position among producer countries, with six agreements involving six European counterparts. Algeria and Namibia follow with three agreements each, while Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia have two each.
The concentration gives Morocco particular strategic importance within the developing network. Its position allows it to connect European institutions and individual European governments with a prospective North African production base.
Yet the broader network remains remarkably thin. The study identifies 972 theoretically possible EU, MENA and Sub Saharan African country pairings, of which only 26 had resulted in agreements. That means approximately 2.7% of the potential bilateral relationships had produced a signed agreement during the period examined.
The implication is that Europe’s hydrogen diplomacy should not yet be interpreted as evidence of a functioning international hydrogen market. It is better understood as the early construction of a diplomatic and institutional network around a market that is still developing.
This distinction is particularly important because bilateral agreements can create political expectations well before the underlying infrastructure exists.
A producer country may sign an agreement with a European government, but moving from diplomatic cooperation to actual exports requires renewable generation, electrolyzers, water infrastructure, hydrogen processing, pipelines or shipping facilities, certification systems, financing and an identified buyer.
MoUs Dominate the Emerging Hydrogen Architecture
Half of the 26 agreements examined in the study are memoranda of understanding. Another 30.8% fall into the study’s binding partnership category, while only one agreement, the 2022 EU Morocco Green Partnership, is classified as a strategic treaty level arrangement.
This creates a significant distinction between hydrogen diplomacy and hydrogen investment.
An MoU can establish cooperation on production, infrastructure, standards or future trade without committing the parties to specific volumes, financing structures or final investment decisions. Consequently, the rapid growth in agreements should not be interpreted as equivalent to a comparable increase in actual hydrogen supply.
This problem extends beyond Europe and Africa. The global hydrogen industry has accumulated a large pipeline of proposed projects, but the conversion of announcements into operating assets remains substantially slower.
The IEA has repeatedly identified uncertain demand, high production costs, infrastructure constraints and regulatory uncertainty as barriers to the development of low emissions hydrogen. Those challenges become particularly relevant when international supply chains require billions of dollars in generation, electrolysis, storage, transport and port infrastructure before commercial hydrogen can be delivered.
The diplomatic agreement is therefore becoming the beginning of the process rather than evidence that the process has succeeded.
The Central Question Is Value Capture
The most consequential issue for producer countries may ultimately have little to do with the volume of hydrogen exported. The question is how much economic value remains in the country producing it.
North Africa and parts of Sub Saharan Africa possess strong solar and wind resources, creating the possibility of producing renewable hydrogen at potentially competitive costs. But renewable resource quality does not determine how the resulting economic value is distributed.
A hydrogen export project can generate demand for renewable electricity, construction, engineering services, ports and logistics. It can also create domestic manufacturing opportunities if governments require local procurement, workforce development and technology transfer.
Alternatively, it can operate primarily as an export enclave, with renewable electricity and other resources directed toward producing hydrogen or derivatives for European customers while providing limited industrial benefits to the domestic economy. That distinction is particularly important because hydrogen production is resource intensive.
Water is one of the most obvious constraints. Electrolysis requires purified water, and although the absolute water requirement of electrolysis is relatively small compared with some other industrial processes, the location of production matters. Several prospective hydrogen exporters operate in regions where water scarcity is already a structural constraint.
The environmental question is therefore not simply whether hydrogen is produced using renewable electricity. It is whether the entire production system is compatible with local water availability, land use and ecological conditions.
The study argues that these considerations should be incorporated directly into bilateral agreements rather than left entirely to European certification systems.
That is a significant policy distinction. Certification can determine whether hydrogen qualifies as renewable or meets particular European sustainability requirements, but certification alone does not necessarily measure who benefits economically from a project or whether local communities receive adequate compensation for land and resource use.
The EU has invested heavily in establishing rules governing renewable hydrogen imports, including requirements concerning additional renewable electricity and emissions accounting. Those rules are essential for ensuring that imported hydrogen actually contributes to decarbonization.
A hydrogen project can comply with European sustainability criteria while still generating limited domestic industrial value in the producing country. Conversely, requirements that maximize export competitiveness could potentially conflict with local electricity demand or industrial development objectives. This creates a policy tension for Europe.
The EU wants hydrogen imports to strengthen industrial competitiveness and reduce emissions without recreating the vulnerabilities associated with fossil fuel imports. Producer countries, meanwhile, have an incentive to use hydrogen investment to diversify their economies, strengthen domestic energy systems and develop manufacturing capacity.
Those objectives can overlap, but they are not automatically aligned. For producer governments, the strategic response is therefore likely to involve negotiating hydrogen partnerships as industrial policy rather than treating them simply as export agreements.
Local manufacturing requirements, workforce development, technology transfer, domestic renewable electricity access and infrastructure sharing can determine whether hydrogen investment creates broader economic spillovers.
The same principle applies to infrastructure. Export pipelines, ammonia terminals and renewable generation built exclusively around European demand may increase export capacity without necessarily strengthening domestic energy security. By contrast, infrastructure designed with multiple uses could create longer term benefits beyond the initial hydrogen trade.
Africa’s Negotiating Position Could Become More Important
The fragmented structure of the current partnership network also raises the possibility of competition among producer countries.
If individual governments compete independently for European investment, they may have incentives to offer increasingly favorable conditions to developers and buyers. That could weaken negotiating leverage over local content, environmental safeguards, technology transfer and revenue distribution.
The study points toward a stronger role for the African Union and other multilateral institutions in establishing common expectations for hydrogen partnerships. Shared principles covering local value capture, environmental protection, contractual transparency and technology transfer could reduce incentives for countries to compete primarily through weaker regulatory or fiscal terms.
Such coordination would also place hydrogen within a broader African industrial development strategy rather than treating it as an isolated export sector.
This matters because hydrogen itself may not become the dominant traded commodity. Hydrogen derivatives such as ammonia, methanol and potentially sustainable aviation fuel may ultimately account for a substantial share of international trade because they can be easier to transport and integrate into existing industrial systems.
The economic structure of those value chains will therefore matter as much as the hydrogen molecule itself.
The study proposes a Green Hydrogen Diplomacy Equity Index, or GHD E.I., designed to evaluate partnerships according to contractual fairness, local value capture, environmental safeguards and institutional reciprocity.
The framework addresses an important weakness in conventional assessments of hydrogen diplomacy. Project announcements are generally measured through headline investment values, electrolyzer capacity or potential hydrogen production. These indicators say little about how economic benefits and risks are distributed.
It has not yet been fully executed or validated against realized project outcomes. Much of the proposed assessment concerns commitments contained in agreements rather than measurable results.
A clause promising technology transfer does not establish that technology will actually be transferred. A local employment commitment does not demonstrate that sustainable skilled employment has been created. Nor does an environmental provision prove that water use, land impacts or biodiversity risks have been effectively managed.
The distinction between contractual intention and observed outcome will become increasingly important as the first generation of hydrogen partnerships moves from diplomatic agreements toward construction and operation.
The study itself acknowledges another limitation: its empirical sample contains only 26 agreements, including just eight observations involving Sub Saharan African countries. Its more advanced causal methods, including gravity models, difference in differences, synthetic controls and causal machine learning, are intended for a later phase.
The current findings therefore provide a map of the emerging diplomatic architecture rather than definitive evidence about what causes successful or equitable hydrogen partnerships.
From Hydrogen Announcements to Industrial Strategy
The emerging European hydrogen relationship with Africa and the Middle East is consequently entering a more demanding phase.
The first stage was largely diplomatic. Governments announced partnerships, published hydrogen strategies and identified prospective export corridors. The next stage will be commercial and industrial.
Projects will need to secure financing, firm offtake, renewable power, water resources, permits and transportation infrastructure. Producer countries will need to determine how much of the resulting industrial activity remains domestic, while European buyers will need to demonstrate that imported hydrogen is competitive against alternative decarbonization pathways.
It could also make the strongest relationships more strategically significant. Countries capable of combining abundant renewable resources with reliable infrastructure, industrial capacity, political stability and credible regulatory frameworks are likely to attract a disproportionate share of future investment.
For Europe, that concentration presents both an advantage and a vulnerability. Fewer, deeper partnerships may be easier to finance and integrate into supply chains, but they could also create new dependencies if the import strategy becomes concentrated among a small number of producer countries.
For producer economies, the opportunity is similarly conditional. Hydrogen can support renewable generation, industrial development, exports and infrastructure investment, but only if partnerships are structured to capture value beyond the production site.
The central question in Europe’s hydrogen diplomacy is therefore moving beyond how many tonnes of renewable hydrogen can be imported. It is increasingly about what economic system those tonnes will create.
If European partnerships deliver local manufacturing, skills, infrastructure, technology transfer and domestic energy benefits alongside exports, hydrogen could become a mechanism for deeper industrial integration between Europe, Africa and the Middle East. If agreements remain focused primarily on securing future molecules for European industry, the transition risks reproducing a familiar pattern in which resources are developed locally while the highest value segments of the supply chain remain elsewhere.
That tension is now becoming one of the defining economic questions of Europe’s emerging green hydrogen strategy.
