Three workers were hospitalized following a hydrogen tank explosion at the Cahpsa industrial park near Asunción on November 30, with one in serious condition and two suffering severe burns. The incident, which prompted a complete facility shutdown and triggered renewed local complaints about hydrogen operations in residential zones, underscores a pattern of recurring safety failures across the global hydrogen sector, even as the industry scales toward clean energy targets.
Pattern of critical failures during non-routine operations
The Cahpsa explosion follows a fatal October blast at SK Energy’s Ulsan refinery in South Korea, where two contract workers died after mistakenly opening a pipe assumed to be empty during maintenance, releasing high-pressure residual hydrogen and triggering a catastrophic explosion. That incident, which injured four others and sparked criminal investigations under South Korea’s Serious Accident Punishment Act, reflects a well-documented trend: analysis of the Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database shows that 27 percent of hydrogen-related incidents occur outside normal operation, during maintenance, commissioning, or immediately after returning from maintenance to routine operation. When normal operations are excluded, the share of incidents tied to these transitional phases becomes a dominant safety concern, reinforcing warnings from the International Association for Hydrogen Safety that deployment must be led by rigorous protocols during the most vulnerable operational moments.
Root causes cluster around material integrity and organizational failures
A 2025 risk assessment examining 62 hydrogen pipeline and storage tank incidents over five decades found that material or manufacturing errors were the most frequent cause of failures, implicated in 13 cases, while management factors, including ineffective maintenance programs and insufficient safety oversight, contributed to 12 pipeline incidents and seven storage tank incidents. Human factors accounted for six storage tank failures, reflecting the high level of direct human interaction with such systems. The same dataset revealed that mechanical integrity and operational failures in storage tanks carry a hazard rating of 1B, catastrophic consequences with probable likelihood, compared to a lower 2C rating for pipelines. Among all incidents, 84 percent involved ignition, with 56 percent resulting in explosions and 28 percent in fires, while only 13 percent were unignited releases.
Training deficits and a lack of hydrogen hazard awareness
Statistical breakdown of 426 incidents in the Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database identified lack of training of operators and plant personnel as the single largest contributing factor, accounting for 23 percent of cases, followed by failures to report near misses or incorporate lessons learned into safety plans at 14 percent, and lack of understanding of hydrogen hazards at 11 percent. Corrosion-related failures, often undetected through regular inspection or resulting from inadequate consideration of the hydrogen compatibility of materials, constituted another significant cluster. These findings point to systemic weaknesses in pre-deployment competency frameworks and ongoing safety culture rather than isolated technical malfunctions.
Geographic concentration and infrastructure expansion
Most hydrogen incidents have occurred in the United States, which accounts for 34 percent of recorded cases, and France, at 21 percent, reflecting their extensive hydrogen infrastructure and industrial activity. The overall incident frequency has fluctuated, with 2019 registering five incidents, the highest annual count in available datasets, potentially driven by infrastructure expansion, increased hydrogen use, or improved reporting practices. Between 2021 and 2022, three additional incidents were recorded, demonstrating that safety challenges persist as deployment accelerates. Approximately 31 percent of all hydrogen pipeline and storage incidents resulted in fatalities or injuries, with 19 cases causing 51 deaths and 58 injuries, underscoring the severe consequences of containment failures.
Regulatory response and corporate accountability
The SK Energy incident at Ulsan triggered a corporate safety overhaul, with CEO Kim Jong-hwa publicly apologizing and establishing an independent committee to review all safety management practices. South Korea’s Ministry of Employment and Labour launched a formal investigation and initiated a two-week intensive supervision period of the company’s safety systems, while the Ulsan Metropolitan Police Agency pursued potential criminal charges under the Industrial Safety and Health Act. The refinery, Korea’s largest at 840,000 barrels per day, had previously experienced a fire in December that halted operations for a week, raising questions about the adequacy of prior corrective measures and whether regulatory frameworks effectively prevent recurrence.
Residential proximity and risk communication
Online reactions to the Paraguay explosion highlight long-standing local concerns about the Cahpsa facility’s operation in a residential area, with residents reportedly contacting authorities seeking a solution before the incident. This mirrors broader challenges in hydrogen risk communication and land-use planning, where technical safety assessments must be reconciled with public perception and the potential for catastrophic harm in populated zones. Optimal sensor placement, safe design concepts for tunnels and confined spaces, and training of first responders have been identified as top-tier research priorities by the International Association for Hydrogen Safety, yet practical implementation lags behind infrastructure buildout.
What recurrent incidents reveal about deployment readiness
The succession of hydrogen explosions in 2024, from South Korea’s Ulsan refinery to Paraguay’s Cahpsa plant, demonstrates that the sector has yet to internalize the lessons systematically recorded in incident databases spanning decades. The concentration of failures during maintenance and commissioning, combined with persistent training deficits and organizational shortcomings, indicates that hydrogen’s role in the clean energy transition will depend less on technological advancement and more on whether operators, regulators, and project developers can enforce the safety-first principles that database evidence has repeatedly validated. Without structural reform of maintenance protocols, competency frameworks, and safety culture, expanded hydrogen deployment risks replicating preventable tragedies at scale.
